In this paper, we address the problem of systematic privacy policy and privacy architecture design. We focus on two relevant aspects of privacy, namely, accountability and personal data control. We propose a systematic design approach of privacy policies adapting the current international data protection regulations, as well as an automated privacy architectures generation method from the corresponding policies. In particular, we propose a high-level policy language and an architecture language, as well as a systematic mapping procedure from policies to the corresponding architectures. We demonstrate the usability of our proposed approach on real-world systems such as Facebook.
Introduction
Personal data protection simply refer to a proper management of personal information and sometimes used in the European Union with respect to privacy related laws and regulation [16] . Conceptually, personal data aims to describe fact, opinion, and communication related to a particular person which is reasonable enough to be regarded as sensitive or confidential by the individual, which he/she might need to limit it from sharing, collection or use.
The main purpose of data protection regulations are creating rights for individuals who have their data processed, and taking responsibilities for those who store, process or transmit such data. For instance, the person who has its data processed has rights for requesting data deletion, correction, or constraint on forwarding. In Europe and Asia, the term 'personal data and personal information' are used in common perspectives while personally identifiable information (PII) is used in the USA [14] , but they referred to a similar thing. Based on the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament [16] , personal data can be defined as any information that can be used to trace a particular individual, such as address, phone number, name, email address, date of birth, etc.. According to the data protection Act 1998 [21] , personal data covers any data that can be used to identify a living individual. However, anonymised or aggregated data is not regulated by the Act.
The notion of accountability was introduced in the OECD's guidelines [22] , and has been actively studied in the recent years in connection with the European personal data protection regulations [7, 15] . The goal of accountability is to ensure that data controllers 1 are be able to demonstrate compliance with the internationally accepted data protection rules, which enables a company to protect themselves in case of dispute. The most notable rules include the Article 29 working party captures most critical aspects of accountability (demonstrating how responsibility is On March 2015, The Guardian UK portal reported [23] that law researchers at the University of Leuven claimed, based on their paper [9] , that Facebook tracks computers of users without their consent, whether they are logged in to Facebook or not, and even if they are not registered users of the site. The tracking method is based on the "social button" plugins embedded in third party webpages. These activities violate the European privacy law, which require prior consent before issuing a cookie or performing tracking. As a result of this investigation, the Belgian privacy commission planned taking Facebook to court, reported by The Gurdian in June 2015 [24] .
Google has been reported to face 15 million Euros fines by Dutch authorities after it has been found to violate the privacy laws. Namely, Google was accussed with taking users' private information such as browsing history and location data to target them with customised ads [12] . The authority ordered the company to inform users of its actions.
A recent privacy violation problem linked to Google Photos was reported on the Nashville Business Journal in July 2015 [13] . According to the report, Google Photos upload users photo to the cloud even if they do not want to. Users was complaining that their photos are uploaded to the cloud after the application has been uninstalled, or worst, this happens even when Google Drive and Google Plus are disabled. The metadata of the photos such as location information are also stored.
Finally, when talking about privacy issue, we cannot pass by the famous Snowden incident two years ago, when according to the leaked slides [17] , the users data stored in online services of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple, along with the widely used cloud service Dropbox, has been retrieved by governmental authorities.
Although it might be the case that these privacy violation incidents are the result of "intentional" neglegency due to the business model of the companies, however, from the technical perspective, to the best of our knowledge, there is not any formal model or systematic method to design privacy policies and architectures, as well as checking the compliance of existing services with the data protection rules. The main advantage of using formal or semi-formal approaches during the system design is that the compliance with the regulations can be confirmed based on mathematical methods, unlike informal reasoning.
Contributions
Addressing the problems discussed in Section 2.1, the goal of this paper is to propose a systematic design method of privacy policies as well as a automated generation of privacy architectures from policies, based on the data protection regulations. The first step in this procedure is to formulate high-level and informal privacy rules as semi-formal policies. To this end, we propose a semi-formal policy language.
We emphasize that although our policy languague variant is inspired by the work of Butin et al. [10] , it is more generic than the one in [10] . For instance, while in [10] the policy is static, meaning that the elements do not change, our policy languague includes permission updates on data handling. In addition, our language covers a broader set of parameters to capture more fine-grained data control policies.
The second step is a systematic derivation of privacy architectures from the defined privacy policies. For this purpose, we propose a semi-formal privacy language for architectures, and the mapping procedure from the policy level to the architecture level. Again, our language for architectures is inspired by the work of Antignac et al. [6] , but it addresses data control and accountability issues, which is not the case in [6] . We will discuss the differences in more details in the Section 3. All of the aforementioned design steps are shown in the first row of the Fig. 1 .
The second row of the Fig. 1 captures the conformance verification approaches. Namely, given an existing services like Facebook or Dropbox, we first specify their privacy policies and privacy architectures based on the two proposed languages, and then comparing the two policies as well as two architectures. 
Related Works
Formal approaches for reasoning about accountability and data control requirements are less investigated so far. Nevertheless, some attempts on formalizing privacy and accountability policies and privacy architectures have been made, such as in [10] and [6] . In [10] , a formal privacy policy language was proposed that defines, for each type of personal data, authorised purposes, deletion delays, request completion delays, admissible contexts and data forwarding policies. Trace compliance properties were defined with respect to data handling events and elements of these privacy policies. The correctness properties relating personal data handling events and system events was also formalized. While the idea is nice, the presented policy language considers limited aspect of accountability and lacks possibilities to reason about data control options for system users. For instance, in [10] there is no possibility to specify the storage mode of the data, and the data control possibilities such as who can have, see or perform actions on certain data. To fill this gap, we extend the policy proposed in [10] with additional syntax and semantics elements, along with the corresponding compliance rules. As a result, our proposed policy is more generic and fine-grained than the one in [10] , and it is capable of modelling data control and accountability requirements in more complex online services such as Facebook or Dropbox.
In this paper, we address a system design methodology that takes into account a comprehensive set of end-to-end accountability and data control requirements, which to the best of our knowledge has not been proposed yet in the previous works. From the data controller's (DC) perspective, end-to-end accountability lifecycle refers to the policies defined by the DC at each stage of the data life cycle [11] , namely, (i) data collection, (ii) data storage, (iii) data usage, (iv) data forwarding/sharing, and (v) data deletion.
The data collection accountability typically involves user consent for the data collection, declaring the purposes of the data collected during the registration procedure, and the retention period of certain collected data. The data storage accountability includes the storage mode of the collected data, such as encrypted or clear form, as well as centralized or decentralized storage. The data usage accountability specifies the authorized usage purposes of the personal data. The data deletion accountability specifies the deletion delay as well as the deletion mode such as manual or automated deletion. Manual deletion refers to the case when the deletion is initiated by a user, e.g., by pressing a button, while in the second case the deletion is performed by the service provider or data controller after a certain delay. Finally, the data forwarding/sharing accountability includes the policy specifying to whom the data can be forwarded or shared by the service provider or data controller [11] .
Our proposed high-level policies can be seen as policies composed of smaller policies that capture each of the end-to-end accountability policy above. In addition, the policies also keep track of the permission groups capturing who can have certain data or perform given actions on it.
In [6] , the authors addressed the problem of privacy-by-design at the architecture level and proposed a formal approach that facilitate systematic architecture design. In particular, they provided the idea of the architecture language and logic, a dedicated variant of epistemic logics [12] , to deal with different aspects of privacy. Basically, an architecture is defined as a set of architecture relations, which capture the computation and communication abilities of each component. For instance, a relation compute i (x = t) specifies that a component C i can compute a value t for the variable x. The proposed language mainly focuses on the computation and integrity verification aspects of data. Unlike in [6] , our proposed language focuses primary on the end-to-end accountability and data control aspects, rather than the data integrity perspective.
Generally speaking, system architecture is the conceptual model that defines the high-level structure and behavior of a system [18] . A system architecture usually comprise system components as well as interfaces among the system's components or subsystems, and the interface between the system and its environment, such as the user. In our paper, similar to [6] , we adopt the architecture definition given in [8] , namely: "the architecture of a system is the set of structures needed to reason about the system, which comprise software and hardware elements, relations among them and properties of both." Our architecture language is based on the concept of the one in [6] , however, it includes different syntax and semantics elements for capturing accountability and data control. The proposed architecture language and policy language are closely related to each other making it feasible to derive the corresponding architecture from a defined policy.
P DC : A Policy Language for Data Control
We propose a high-level privacy policy language (called P DC ) to specify and reason about data control and accountability requirements. The data subjects in our model are system users whose personal data has been collected or input to the system by some entity, who can be either the data subject or someone else (including the service provider). For instance, a user or can post some photo X of a user tar, as well as a service provider can collect some information X of a user during the registration. The privacy policies capture the end-to-end accountability and data control requirements defined in a system. In the following, we discuss the notation concept of the privacy policies and the meaning of their elements.
Policy Syntax
We assume four finite sets of activities defined in a system: A1 = {act1 1 , . . . , act1 n }, and UA1 = {unact1 1 , . . . , unact1 n }, A2 = {act2 1 , . . . , act2 m }, and UA2 = {unact2 1 , . . . , unact2 m }. Each act1 ∈ A1 represents an action performed by an entity or on some data dt, and its revocation counterpart unact1 ∈ UA1. In addition, each act2 ∈ A2 captures an action performed by an entity or with some other entity tar (or group of entities) on a data dt, and its revocation counterpart unact2 ∈ UA2. An example of act1 would be like in Facebook, while the act2 could be share. These act1 and act2 actions are service specific, meaning that they are different, for example, in case of Facebook or Dropbox. Furthermore, our language includes the pre-defined actions own, store, use, deletereq, delete, group, and ungroup, which are common in most systems.
Definition 1 (Data Control Policy). The syntax of the data control policies are defined as tuples:
Each policy is defined on each (personal) data dt, capturing the data control settings on this data. A data dt is defined as the tuple (ow, ds, θ, id, actby), where ow is the onwer of the data who inputs this data into the system 2 , ds specifies a set of data subjects included in this data, θ is the type and id a unique identifier of the data, while actby is a tuple of (S been act i the set of users with whom action act i (either act1 or act2 ) has been performed on this data. We note that in our model the tuple (ow, ds, θ, id) is fixed, while actby can be changed during the system run. Intuitively, this means that the content of the data and its metadata will not change, but the set of users who are involved in activities performed on the data.
Specifically, in π dt ∈ Pol DT , where π dt = (ap, dm, wh, ho, acp, has), ap is the set of authorized purposes of data usage, dm defines the set of pairs of (deletion mode, deletion delay), which can be either (man, dd) or (aut, dd). In (man, dd), man refers to a manual deletion initiated by a user, while dd represents the delay for the deletion after the initiation (e.g., when a user presses a delete button). In (aut, dd), aut refers to automated deletion with the delay dd. Automated deletion refers to the worst case retention delay for personal data, for instance, the deletion delay after a user has unregistered from the system. wh is a set of places where the data dt is stored, for instance, in a client computer or in the service provider's servers, namely, wh = {clientloc, sploc}. ho is the set of forms in which the data dt is stored, for example, in encrypted or plaintext forms, ho = {enc, plain}. acp is the set of policies specifying which entities can do which kind of actions/operations on a given data dt. Each action policy is a tuple of the entities who have been granted permission (either by the service provider by default, or by a user) to do certain actions on dt, namely:
can act i denotes the sets of the users who are allowed to perform action act i (either act1 or act2 ). Finally, has is the set of entities who are allowed (either by the service provider by default, or by a user) to have dt after a certain action act has been performed by someone (either the service provider or a user) on this data. The has part of the policy π dt is a tuple of permission groups, has = (G includes the entities who can have dt as a result of a group action, meaning the addition of some user to a group (e.g., add friends).
Policies Semantics
The semantics of this high-level policy is defined based on a set of abstract events and compliant traces corresponding to a system. Each abstract event captures an action, or a high-level event happens during the system run. These events are abstract, because they specify high-level actions happen during the system operation, ingoring the low-level system internals such as writting to a memory space (i.e., system log level). Events are defined by tuples starting with an event name capturing the event happens with dt, followed by the time of the event, then the data involved in the event, and ends with the current policy of dt.
Given the activity sets A1, A2, AU1, AU2 defined in the system, for each data dt defined with ow, ds, θ, id, and π dt the function EV(A1, A2, AU1, AU2, ow, ds, θ, id, π dt ) returns the following possible events corresponding to dt:
In the sequel, we refer to each element e of a tuple tup by tup.e, for example, we can refer to ap in π dt by π dt .ap. Event own captures the fact that the data dt is initially owned (possessed) by or with the policy π dt . Event store specifies that the data dt is stored based on the method specified in π dt .wh and π dt .ho at time t. In deletereq, a request is received by the service provider (e.g., user presses the delete button in Facebook) from user or at time t to delete the data dt. Note that deletereq only takes place when π dt .dm = (man, dd). The event delete captures the fact that the data dt was deleted at time t. The events groupact and ungroupact capture the moment when the entity or adds (removes) the entity tar to (from) the set G can act in π dt . In other words, these events specify the permission granted (revoked) by or to tar to perform action act on the data dt. Similarly, events grouphas and ungrouphas capture the moment when the entity or adds (removes) tar to (from) the set G group has in π dt . Event use defines the authorized purposes of the data usage. For the events act1 and unact1, entity or performs action act1 and unact1, respectively, on the data dt. Finally, events act2 and unact2 capture the events happenning at time t in which act2 and unact2 have been performed on dt, respectively, by or with tar, besides the policy π dt . In case of Ev6, Ev7, and Ev10 -Ev13 the number of events depends on the size of the sets A1, A2, AU1, and AU2.
Definition 2 (Trace). A trace τ is a sequence of abstract events.
Traces capture the current operation of a system, which can be either compliant or noncompliant with the accountability and data control requirements. In order to define the notion of compliant traces, we need to introduce first the notion of abstract states.
Definition 3 (Abstract state). The abstract state of a system is a function
:
The abstract state associated with the data of an owner ow with ID id and type θ about the data subject ds is composed of a timestamp, the current value of the data, the set of actions performed by someone on this data (ActBy), the current policy attached to this data, and a set of users who have this data at this time. Specifically:
The notation [(ow, ds, θ, id) → (t, v, actby, π dt , H has )] captures a state update, and is used to denote a state similar to except that (ow, ds, θ, id) = (t, v, actby, π dt , H has ). The semantics of an event at a given position j in a trace is specified by the function S A : (Event × N ) → AbstractState → AbstractState. Specifically, we have:
Since the event use does not change the current state, for the sake of simplicity, we left it out from the above list. As a result of event own the owner of the data dt is added to the set H has . Event H has adds the service provider sp to H has either in case dt is stored as plaintext at the service provider location or encrypted with the service provider's key. Otherwise, the state is unchanged. Event deletereq does not change the current state, however, it only takes place when the deletion policy allows manual deletion initiated by users. Event delete replaces the current state to the undefined state ⊥. 
Trace Compliance
Compliance for traces of events is defined to capture the data control and accountability respected operation of the system. We define five most relevant trace compliance rules C 1 -C 5 , which are concerning directly with the accountability and data control properties. The high-level interpretation of each rule is as follows:
• C 1 : A data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ) is only used for purposes defined in the corresponding policy.
• C 2 : If the policy forbids user or to perform an action * , where * ∈ {act1, unact1, act2, unact2, delete}, on the data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ), then it cannot perform this action.
• C 3 : If a user tar has a data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ), then there can be three cases: (i) tar = ow, namely, tar initially owns and inputs this data to the system; or (ii) it is a consequence of an action from A1, or (iii) it is a consequence of an action from A2 performed on this data.
• C 4 : If the service provider sp has a data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, π dt , . . . ), then either (i) ((plain,
wh).
• C 5 : The deletion of a data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ) must happen within the specified deletion delay, dm, after the deletion request has been initiated.
Before formalizing these compliance rules in Fig. 2 , we provide some auxiliary definitions. The current state after the execution of a trace τ = [ev 1 ,. . . , ev n ] is defined as F A (τ , 1) 0 with ∀ (ow, ds θ, id): 0 (ow, ds θ, id) = ⊥, and
•
where, State A (τ , i) = F A (τ |i , 1) 0 with τ |i = τ 1 . . . τ i representing the prefix of length i of τ . In Fig. 2 , rule C 1 says that if the data dt is used for some purposes at the i-th event in a trace, and the policy at the (i − 1)th state is π dt , then purposes must be subset of π dt .ap. C 2 captures that if or performed act on dt at the i-th event, and the policy at the (i − 1)th state is π dt , then or must has been permitted to perform this action, namely, or ∈ π dt .act.G can * . Rule C 3 says that if tar has data dt at the i-th state, then there can be three cases: (i) tar is the same as ow, (ii)-(iii) at a previous k-th event (takes place at time t ) tar has been added to H has as a result of act1 and act2, respectively. C 4 captures that if at the i-th state if sp ∈ H has , then either dt is stored at the service provider side. Finally, C 5 specifies the fact that the deletion must happens within dd delay after deletereq has been launched. Trace compliance is defined with respect to the five rules above: Definition 4 (Trace compliance) A trace τ is compliant if it satisfies all of the properties C 1 , . . . , C 5 . In order to design and derive the architectures corresponding to the privacy policies defined with P DC , we propose an architecture language, A DC . A DC follows a similar concept of the language introduced in [6] , however, it has been modified accordingly for our purpose. Unlike the architecture language in [6] , which mainly focuses on data computation and verification of the data integrity, A DC primary addresses the end-to-end accountability and data control aspects. Hence, A DC defines different syntax and semantics elements for capturing the end-to-end accountability and data control requirements.
Architectures Syntax
Assuming a finite m users in the system, we define the set of system users:
Users are uniquely identified based on their indices. Terms model any data defined in the system (e.g. in case of the social networks, data can be posts, notes, photos and basic information about the users. Term T is defined by
TYPE(T ) ::= θ
We assume a finite set of data subjects (ds ∈ DS), a finite set of data IDs (id ∈ ID), and a finite set of types (θ ∈ T Y). D
ow,ds id
represents data constants of different categories (e.g., certain basic information, photos, posts, notes, messages, etc.). For each user U i we define a finite set of variables V i = {X as a result of the group/ungroup action. , dd) saying that U i is able to send a delete request which will be executed by the service provider with a dd delay.
The architecture PA is defined by a set of activities (relations) of users or services providers (denoted by {F}). The formal definition of privacy architectures is given as follows: -----------------------------------
PA ::= {F} F ::= Own i (X ow,ds id ) | Posses sp (X ow,ds id ) | Posses sp (F (X ow1,ds1 id1 , . . . , X owr,dsr idr )) | Posses sp (X), X ∈ {X ow1,ds1 id1 ,. . . , X owr,dsr idr } | GroupAct i,tar (G ) | UnGroupAct i,tar (G ) | GroupHas i,tar (G ) | UnGroupHas i,tar (G ) | DeleteReq i (X ow,ds id ) | Delete sp (X ow,ds id , dd) | Act1 i (X ow,ds id ) | UnAct1 i (X ow,ds id ) | Act2 i,tar (X ow,ds id ) | UnAct2 i,tar (X ow,ds id ) ----------------------------------- Activity Own i (X ow,
Architectures Semantics
The semantics of an architecture is based on its set of compatible traces. A trace Γ is a sequence of high-level events Seq( ) occurring in the system as presented in the Table below. 
-----------------------------------
Events can be seen as instantiated activities in the architecture with specific value bounded to variables at certain time. Events are given the same names as the corresponding activities but in lowercase letters. For example, event own ow (X 
where Empty denotes the empty variable state (∀X ∈ Var, Empty(X) = ⊥). In addition, each group of permission is empty as well. The semantics function S T is defined in Table 1 , which specifies the impact of a trace on the state of each user U i . It is defined as an iteration through the trace with function S E defining the impact of each type of event on the states of the users. The notation .θ is used to denote a trace whose first element is and the rest of the trace is θ.
Each event modifies only the state of the user U i . This modification is expressed as σ[σ i /(v, p, t)] (or σ[σ i /⊥]
in the case of the undefined state) that replaces the variable and permission parts of the state of U i by v and p respectively. We assume that no event θ a with a > a involves user U i if its state σ i is equal to ⊥ after the occurrence of θ a (i.e., any error in the activity trace of a user causes termination of the trace).
As an effect of the event own ow X Table 1 : Semantics of events traces.
Definition 5 (Semantics of architectures)
The semantics of an architecture PA is defined as:
Definition 6 (Compatibility) A trace θ of length θ is compatible with an architecture PA if and only if:
∀a ∈ [1, θ], ∃α ∈ PA, C(θ a , α)
where C( , α) holds if and only if can be obtained from α by adding specific values V for variables and instantiating index variables to constant index values.
We can now define the semantics of an architecture PA as the set of the possible states produced by consistent traces.
Privacy Logic
In this section, we propose a logic to reason about the privacy and data control requirements of architectures. The logic is based on the architecture language A DC defined above.
Definition 7 provides the semantics of a property φ. Table 2 as the set of architectures satisfying φ.
Definition 7 The semantics S(φ) of a property φ is defined in

PA ∈ S(HAS
and if completely defined ( X ow,ds id does not contain any ⊥ ) . In order to reason about the privacy property of architectures, a set of deduction rules (axioms) of the data control logic is provided. The fact that an architecture PA satisfies a property φ is denoted by PA φ. Ten deduction rules (H1-H10) are defined in the Table 4 to capture privacy related requirements.
Let us consider the abbreviations in Table 3 .
ow,ds id
).
). : V, t take place (i.e., a deletion request has been sent by user U i at t and the deletion took effect at t ), then t should be within dd delay since t, and no user has the deleted data X ow,ds id from time t .
From Policy to Architecture
In this section, we provide a systematic mapping procedure from the policy level to the architecture level, and provide some formal properties of the mapping.
First of all, the mapping between the privacy policy syntax and the architecture syntax is discussed, and then the correspondence between their semantics is provided.
Each action act1 ∈ A1, act2 ∈ A1, unact1 ∈ UA1, and unact2 ∈ UA2 is mapped to a corresponding activity in the architecture level, respectively. The predefined activities deletereq, delete, group, ungroup are mapped to the corresponding architecture activities Deletereq, Delete, Group, UnGroup, respectively.
In addition, each data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ) in the policy is corresponding to each variable X ), regardless of the value of ho. This is because when the user data is stored in the user's computer (client side), then only this user owns and possesses initially the data. In case of server side storage, for the pair ({sploc}, {plain}) W returns both Own ow (X
ow,ds id
) and Possess sp (X ow,ds id ) architectural elements. In case of storing in an encryted form but with the service provider's key, (enc, spkey), the service provider possesses the ciphertext and its key. Finally, if the data is encrypted with the client key (not known by the service provider), then the service provider only possesses the ciphertext.
The action policy act for a given data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ) corresponds to the permission sets in the architecture level as follows:
Similarly, the has policy has for a given data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ) corresponds to the permission sets in the architecture level as follows:
In the sequel, for the sake of brevity we let tup = (ow, ds, θ, id). The activities in the architecture are extracted from the policy events based on the function Arch as follows: 
In the following, we provide the properties that capture the correspondence between the trace compliance rules (in the policy level) and the deduction rules (in the architecture level).
Property 1
The connection between the compliance rules in the policy level and architecture level is summarized in points P 1-P 6: Note that in Property 1 we only consider compliance rules that affect the HAS properties. Intuitively, P 1 says that if user U j has not been granted any right to have the data dt = (ow, ds, θ, id, . . . ) in any possible traces, then none of the pre-conditions of H1-H4 holds, which results in HAS never j (X
ow,ds id
). The situation is similar in the reverse direction. P 2 captures the case when U ow has a data because it is an owner of that data. P 3 and P 4 capture the case when U ow has a data as a consequence of an action from A1 and A2, respectively. P 5 considers the case when the service provider initially has a data. Finally, P 6 captures the correspondence between the rules on deletion delays.
Case Studies
In this section, we provide some illustrative examples to demonstrate the usage of our languages on real-world online services. Our first case study is on Facebook.
Facebook Policy and Architecture
In case of Facebook, we have the following activity sets 3 . A1 = {like, comment}, and UA1 = {unlike, uncomment}, A2 = {post, tag, mention, share}, and UA2 = {unpost, untag, unmention, unshare}.
The data control policy of Facebook can be given as follows: 
) -----------------------------------
Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we investigated the problem of automated system design focusing on the accountability and personal data control aspects. We proposed a systematic design approach based on semi-formal method. In particular, we proposed a high-level policy language and an architeture language, as well as a systematic generation of the corresponding architectures from the specified policies. The policy language enables us to encode the current international (EU, UK, US, Japan, etc.) regulations written in natural language in a more precise way. Further, based on the defined semantics and compliant properties we can also reason about the data control requirements fulfilled by the system. Finally, this policy language enables us to compare policies with each other (e.g., comparing a current policy defined by company with updated international regulation).
The proposed architecture language can be used to define high-level architectures (functionality) of systems. The semantics and deduction rules of the language enables us to reason about the data control properties of systems. Eventually, the defined mapping procedures facilitate a systematic generation of system architectures from the defined corresponding policies. It is important to emphasize that both the proposed policy and architecture languages are easily expandable with further syntax and semantics elements.
Also note that our proposed languages are designed to be "fine-grained" making it suitable for defining generic systems, however, in some specific systems (e.g., Facebook), simplification can be made with specific features (e.g., addfriends, unfriends) as we can see in the case study section.
One of our future plan is to develop a sofware tool based on the theoretical foundations presented in this paper. We vision a tool that allows users (e.g., policy designers) to define data control policies in the proposed syntax, and featuring automated policy comparison and architecture generation.
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